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Abstract 
Recent developments have shown that the EU’s border security policy is greatly influenced by the US. This 
influence simultaneously has implications for other EU policies, including those on data protection. This 
paper highlights that policy-making at the transatlantic level is increasingly taking place through informal 
networks, such as the High-Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security and the High-
Level Contact Group on data protection, which allow US involvement in EU policy-making. This tendency 
stems from the growing personal relationships among policy-makers, the gradual substitution of formal 
instruments with less formal contracts and informal understandings shaping the content of formal 
agreements. Drawing from empirical examples of EU–US cooperation on data protection in the context of 
homeland security, the paper analyses the repercussions of these developments and the issues that remain 
unresolved, and offers policy recommendations.  
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MADE IN THE USA? THE INFLUENCE OF THE US 
ON THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION REGIME 
CEPS LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN EUROPE/NOVEMBER 2009 
PATRYK PAWLAK
* 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the issues of data protection and privacy have dominated much of the 
transatlantic agenda. The discussion started with the controversial transfer of passenger name 
record (PNR) data to the US Customs and Border Protection and ensued over the use of SWIFT 
data for the fight against terrorism.
1 Currently, the EU and the US are considering a way 
forward, including the conclusion of an EU–US international agreement on data protection. 
Such an agreement would have significant consequences for the EU data protection system and 
the daily life of EU citizens. The latest Commission proposal for the next multi-annual 
programme for the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (the Stockholm Programme) states 
explicitly that “the work on data protection conducted with the US could serve as a basis for 
future agreements”.
2 Therefore, it is both timely and necessary to reflect on the possible shape 
of the EU data protection regime. In this context, it is also worth exploring the evolution of EU–
US relations from having an antagonistic character to a converging one. Although several 
authors have addressed the far-reaching implications these measures pose for EU citizens and 
third-country nationals,
3 many issues still call for systematic study.  
The objective of this paper is to examine the role the US plays in the development of the border 
policies of the EU. Towards that aim, it investigates the processes underlying transatlantic 
cooperation in the field of personal data transfers for security purposes. The paper argues that 
the influence of the US in these EU policies has strengthened the prevailing role of the US as an 
agenda-setter and the emergence of new actors and informal networks at the transatlantic level. 
The consequent learning process has resulted in increasing trust and the build-up of personal 
relationships between EU and American policy-makers. This process has not only made the EU 
more open towards American policies, but has also led to the development of similar solutions 
in other EU affairs.
4 
                                                      
* Patryk Pawlak is a researcher at the European University Institute in Florence and a member of the 
Transatlantic Post-Doc Fellowship for International Relations and Security (TAPIR). The author is 
grateful to Sergio Carrera and the anonymous reviewer for their comments and suggestions on earlier 
drafts of this paper. 
1 See Y. Moiny, Protection of personal data and citizens’ rights of privacy in the fight against the 
financing of terrorism, CEPS Policy Brief No. 67, CEPS, Brussels, March 2005. Criticism of these 
policies was expressed, among others, by Peter Hobbing in Tracing Terrorists: The EU–Canada 
Agreement in PNR Matters, CEPS Special Report, CEPS, Brussels (revised version), 17 November 2008. 
2 European Commission, Communication on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice serving the citizen, 
COM(2009) 262 final, Brussels, 10 June 2009. 
3 See for instance, E. Guild, S. Carrera and F. Geyer, The Commission’s new border package. Does it take 
us one step closer to a ‘cyber-fortress Europe’?, CEPS Policy Brief No 154, CEPS, Brussels, March 
2008. 
4 See J. Argomaniz, “When the EU is the ‘norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records agreement and the 
EU’s internalisation of US border security norms”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1, 
2009, pp. 119-136. For more about the theoretical underpinnings of this paper, see P.S. Ring and A.H. 2 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
2.  Towards a transatlantic smart border? 
The strategy of ‘smart borders’ presented by the White House in 2002 assumed that “[t]he border 
of the future must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and people prior to their arrival in 
sovereign US territory”.
5 To that end, the advanced technology was applied “to track the 
movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles”.
6 The 
implementation of this policy was pursued in several ways, including the expansion of the US-
VISIT Programme to new areas or most recently through the establishment of the Electronic 
System of Travel Authorisation (ESTA). The US-VISIT Programme was conceived in 1996 as a 
tool to help identify visa over-stayers. It was re-launched after the terrorist attacks of 2001 to include 
travellers’ biometric information (i.e. digital fingerprints and a photograph), with the objective of 
checking them against a watch list of known criminals and suspected terrorists. The use of PNR 
information was meant to further improve this capability and to help identify connections between 
travellers on the same flight who might belong to the same terrorist group. Similarly, the ESTA system 
is a new pre-travel authorisation programme for travellers from visa-waiver countries. The information 
submitted is checked against several law enforcement databases before a person’s departure. The 
purpose of this new tool is to mitigate security risks associated with the travel of persons who have the 
nationality of visa-waiver countries.  
The US response came to be perceived as not just “re-bordering” with enhanced border controls 
physically located between states
7 but as leading to the emergence of wide zones of virtual, 
transnational border-control practices that span the globe.
8 As Guild (2003) concluded, the border 
took on “a new sacred symbolism as the line of security”.
9 Effective border controls that did not 
undermine international trade and legitimate travel could not be achieved without globally 
implemented instruments.
10 Since the Bush administration considered international mechanisms too 
time-consuming and potentially ineffective,
11 they opted for the unilateral adoption of laws. Because of 
                                                                                                                                                            
Van De Ven, “Developmental processes of cooperative interorganisational relationships”, Academy of 
Management Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1994, pp. 90-118. 
5 The White House, Smart Borders for the 21
st Century, Office of the Press Secretary, Washington, D.C., 
25 January 2002(a) (retrieved from http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive_Index/Border_Security_Smart_ 
Borders_for_the_21st_Century.html). 
6 Ibid. 
7 See P. Andreas, “Re-bordering of America after 11 September”, Brown Journal of World Affairs, Vol. 
8, No. 2, 2002, pp. 195-202; see also P. Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the 21
st 
Century”,  International Security, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2003, pp. 78-112; and also M.B. Salter, “At the 
Threshold of Security: A Theory of Borders”, in M.B. Salter and E. Zureik (eds), Global Surveillance and 
Policing: Borders, Security, Identity, New York: Willan Publishing, 2005, pp. 36-50. 
8 See R. Koslowski, International cooperation to create smart borders, Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 2004; see also M.B. Salter, “Borders, Passports, and the Global 
Mobility Regime”, in B.S. Turner (ed.), Handbook of Globalization Studies, London: Taylor and Francis, 
2009. For a criticism of such an approach, see D. Bigo, “Globalized (in)Security: The Field and the Ban-
opticon”, in D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala (eds), Terror, Insecurity and Liberty, London: Routledge, 2008, pp. 
10-48. 
9 E. Guild, “International terrorism and EU immigration, asylum and border policy: The unexpected 
victims of 11 September 2001”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2003, p. 345. 
10 S.E. Flynn, “Beyond Border Control”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, 2000. 
11 Derived from interviews with US officials, Washington, D.C., March–July 2007. About 74 face-to-face 
interviews were conducted from October 2006 to February 2009, as a part of doctoral research. The 
interviewees were representatives of the EU institutions, the US administration, non-governmental 
organisations and research institutes. All of the interviewees agreed to be quoted as a part of this research 
in exchange for being granted anonymity. THE INFLUENCE OF THE US ON THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION REGIME | 3 
 
their extraterritorial character and broad implications for civil liberties,
12 many of those measures 
provoked disagreements of a legal and political nature, especially in the EU.
13 For instance, measures 
like the ESTA were criticised with concerns that “security management is shifting from a state-based 
perspective to a more individual-based focus”.
14 
The transnational nature of the US homeland security regulations and their coercive 
mechanisms (such as fines or the refusal of landing rights for air operators in the case of PNR 
transfers) compelled the EU to adjust its policies in line with those of the US. The enhanced 
cooperation between EU and American officials that developed on the occasions of numerous 
bilateral contacts eventually led to the EU embracing some normative principles underlying the 
policies of the US. The use of personal information for security purposes and the protection of 
such information became the most controversial and debated issues in transatlantic relations. 
Some of the major points of divergence stemmed from differences in approaches to the 
treatment and transmission of personal information. In the EU, the system of data protection 
derives from rules in Continental law and it frames the right to privacy as one of fundamental 
human rights. The US, on the other hand, treats personal information as a commodity and the 
right to privacy is protected by common law mechanisms. 
Despite numerous differences, the EU and US advanced their cooperation on data exchange. A 
series of bilateral agreements has been concluded, including the EU–US PNR Agreements of 
2004, 2006 and 2007,
15 the Europol–US Agreement of 2002,
16 and the SWIFT Agreement of 
2007.
17 Furthermore, the discussion about border protection in the EU increasingly resembles that at 
the transatlantic level. It is now recognised that “migratory pressure, as well as the prevention of entry 
of persons seeking to enter the EU for illegitimate reasons, are obvious challenges facing the Union”.
18 
                                                      
12 See E. Guild, “The judicialisation of armed conflict: Transforming the twenty-first century”, in J. 
Huysmans, A. Dobson and R. Prokhovnik (eds), The politics of protection, sites of insecurity and political 
agency, London: Routledge, 2006; D. Bigo, S. Carrera, E. Guild and R.B.J. Walker, The changing 
landscape of European liberty and security: Mid-term report on the results of the CHALLENGE project, 
CHALLENGE Research Paper No. 4, CEPS, Brussels, February 2007; A. Tsoukala, Security, Risk and 
Human Rights: A vanishing relationship?, CEPS Special Report, CEPS, Brussels, September 2008. 
13 In 2004, Pat Cox, the president of the European Parliament, stated that “[w]hile naturally accepting that 
the US Administration is perfectly free to exercise its sovereign right to protect its own homeland, both 
the EU and the US must guard against a new form of creeping extra-territoriality” (Cox, 2004). 
14 European Parliament, Data protection from a transatlantic perspective: The EU and US move towards 
an international data protection agreement?, PE 408.320, DG for Internal Policies of the Union, 
Brussels, October 2008, p. 30. 
15 See Council of the European Union, Council Decision 2004/496/EC of 17 May 2004 on the conclusion 
of an Agreement between the European Community and the United States of America on the processing 
and transfer of PNR data by Air Carriers to the United States Department of Homeland Security, Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 183, 20.05.2004; see also Council of the European Union, 
Agreement between the European Union and the United States of America on the processing and transfer 
of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data by air carriers to the United States Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), OJ L 204, 04.08.2007(a). 
16 Council of the European Union, Consolidated version of the Draft Supplemental Agreement between 
the United States of America and Europol on the exchange of personal data and related information, 
15231/02, Brussels, 5 December 2002. 
17 Council of the European Union, Processing of EU-originating Personal Data by United States Treasury 
Department for Counter-Terrorism Purposes – ‘SWIFT’, 10741/2/07 REV 2, Brussels, 29 June 2007(b). 
18 European Commission, Communication on preparing the next steps in border management in the 
European Union, COM(2008) 69 final, Brussels, 13 February 2008. 4 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
The border package presented by the European Commission
19 proposes a number of measures similar 
to those adopted in the US. For instance, third-country nationals subject to the visa obligation are 
already verified in conjunction with their visa application, but in the future they will be checked against 
the Visa Information System, which entails biometric information. In addition, all persons travelling to 
the EU by air will be checked through their advanced passenger information. Other new tools currently 
debated include facilitation of border crossing for bona fide travellers, introduction of an extry/exit 
system and establishment of an ESTA.  
Among all these developments, two deserve particular attention: a) the discussion of a potential, 
international, data protection agreement between the EU and the US and b) the establishment of the EU 
PNR system. While the former exemplifies the progress in EU–US cooperation, the latter shows 
clearly the extent to which the EU’s internal security policies are influenced by the instruments 
previously adopted in the US.  
2.1  The EU–US PNR Agreements 
In the US, the 9/11 National Commission Report stated clearly that “targeting travel is at least 
as powerful a weapon against terrorists as targeting their money. The US should combine 
terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement in a strategy to intercept terrorists, 
find terrorist travel facilitators, and constrain terrorist mobility”.
20 To that effect, the 2004 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act called on the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) to establish mechanisms that would allow a comparison of “passenger 
information for any international flight to or from the US against the consolidated and integrated 
terrorist watch-list maintained by the Federal Government before departure of the flight”.
21 On 
the basis of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001, the US requested all airlines 
arriving to or departing from US airports to submit PNR data. To ensure greater compliance, it 
was established that airlines failing to comply could be fined up to $6,000 per passenger and 
lose landing rights.  
The American legislation in question undermined the EU data protection laws, in particular the 
EU’s Data Protection Directive of 1995, which constitutes the backbone of EU activities in this 
area.
22 According to Art. 25 of the Directive, any transborder transfer of personal information is 
only allowed if it has been decided that the third country provides an “adequate level of 
protection” in terms of the standards applied in the EU.
23 Since no such decision had been taken 
regarding the US data protection system,
24 any transfer of passenger data should be considered 
illegal. Caught between the two legal systems, the airline industry insisted on the EU and the 
                                                      
19 Ibid. 
20 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission report: Final 
report of the national commission on terrorist attacks upon the United States, New York: W.W. Norton 
and Company, 2004, p. 385. 
21 See the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108−458, 118 Stat. 
3638, 17 December 2004, Section 4012(2). 
22 Council of the European Union, Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, OJ L 
281, 23.11.1995. 
23 The list of derogations is covered by Art. 26 of the Data Protection Directive. 
24 Indeed, only three countries and three British dependent territories have qualified according to the 
adequacy criteria of the European Commission: Jersey (2008), the Isle of Man (2004), Argentina (2003), 
Guernsey (2003), Canada (2002) and Switzerland (2000). THE INFLUENCE OF THE US ON THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION REGIME | 5 
 
US finding a solution that would ensure legal certainty for air operators.
25 At the same time, the 
European Parliament and the Article 29 Working Party on Data Protection expressed various 
doubts about many aspects of a potential agreement, including its objective, the number of data 
items to be collected, the data retention period and the lack of means for extra-judicial appeal.
26 
The broad implications for transatlantic trade and tourism made the European Commission 
adopt a more moderate approach.  
In the joint declaration of February 2002, the European Commission and the US Customs and 
Border Protection expressed the opinion that all necessary measures should be taken “to 
reconcile and respect fully legal obligations on both sides leading towards a mutually 
satisfactory solution, providing legal certainty. For this purpose both sides [would] engage in an 
intense dialogue to reach a mutually satisfactory solution without delay.”
27 The main challenge 
for the European Commission and the Council was to find a solution to legal problems posed by 
the US-based regulation. In the case of the PNR, the major issue was to provide legal certainty 
for the airlines operating transatlantic flights and to ensure that in the future similar regulations 
would be discussed well in advance. To facilitate these aims, both sides agreed to establish the 
High-Level Political Dialogue on Border and Transportation Security (PDBTS), for the 
discussion of various aspects of new policies. Eventually, the EU–US PNR deal was concluded 
in 2007 after the annulment of the 2004 Agreement by the European Court of Justice and the 
expiration of the Interim Agreement of 2006.
28 
2.2 The  Commission’s  proposal for the EU PNR system 
Several months after the conclusion of the EU–US PNR Agreement of 2007, the European 
Commission presented its proposal for a framework decision to establish the EU PNR system as 
a component of the EU’s anti-terrorism package.
29 The introduction of this system was 
discussed in the Multidisciplinary Group on organised crime, with the most recent version of the 
proposal (incorporating the findings of Slovenian and French presidencies) being presented on 
23 January 2009.
30 This initiative was puzzling given several European objections to a similar 
instrument as that implemented in the US. It is noteworthy that the rationale for the EU PNR 
system provided in the proposal is mostly internal
31 and includes no reference to the American 
PNR system or similar ones being established worldwide (only the references to ICAO
32 and 
                                                      
25 P. Pawlak, “Transatlantic border and transport security cooperation: Can one swallow make a 
summer?”, in D. Hansen and M. Ranstorp, Cooperating against terrorism: EU-US relations post 
September 11, National Defence College, Stockholm, 2007(b). 
26 European Parliament, Transmission of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights, 
European Parliament resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic flights: 
State of negotiations with the USA, P5_TA-PROV(2003)0429, 9 October 2003(b). 
27 European Commission, European Commission/US customs talks on PNR transmission: Joint statement, 
Brussels, 17-18 February 2003. 
28 For more details about these agreements, see E. Guild and E. Brouwer, The political life of data: The 
ECJ decision on the PNR Agreement between the EU and the US, CEPS Policy Brief No. 109, CEPS, 
Brussels, July 2006; see also Argomaniz (2009), op. cit. 
29 European Commission, “Fight against terrorism: Stepping up Europe’s capabilities to protect citizens 
against the threat of terrorism”, IP/07/1649, Brussels, 6 November 2007. 
30 This proposal was the most recent at the time of writing. See Council of the European Union, Proposal 
for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement 
purposes, 5618/09, Brussels, 23 January 2009. 
31 The Hague Programme and the extraordinary Council meeting of 13 July 2005 are mentioned as two 
points at which the Commission was called upon to establish an EU PNR system. 
32 ICAO refers to the International Civil Aviation Organisation.  6 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
IATA
33 are made). Such an approach clearly suggests that the Commission is trying to avoid 
any association with the US PNR initiative in order to reduce internal opposition in the EU. The 
linkage between the EU and the US PNR systems would be more difficult to make if there were 
not a surprising similarity between the Commission’s proposal and the provisions of the EU–US 
PNR Agreements (see Table 1).
34 
Table 1. Comparison of the EU–US PNR I, PNR III and the EU’s PNR proposal 
Issue  EU–PNR PNR I  PNR III  EU PNR 
Purpose  Preventing and combating  
•  terrorism and related 
crimes;  
•  other serious crimes, 
including organised 
crime, that are 
transnational in nature;  
•  flight from warrants or 
custody for the crimes 
described above. 
 
Same as the PNR I;  
The PNR may be used 
where necessary for the 
protection of the vital 
interests of the data 
subject or other persons, or 
in any criminal judicial 
proceedings, or as 
otherwise required by law. 
Preventing, detecting, 
investigating and 
prosecuting terrorist 
offences and serious 
crime; 
The EU PNR is applied 
solely to air transportation 
but member state 
authorities may expand it 
to other areas (Point 7a). 
Sensitive data   The CBP will not use 
‘sensitive’ data from the 
PNR. The CBP will 
implement an automated 
system that filters and 
deletes certain sensitive 
PNR codes and terms that 
the CBP has identified in 
consultation with the 
European Commission. 
 
The DHS employs an 
automated system that 
filters sensitive PNR codes 
and terms and does not use 
this information. Unless 
the data is accessed for an 
exceptional case, the DHS 
promptly deletes the 
sensitive EU PNR data. 
 
No risk-assessment 
criterion is to be based on 
sensitive data, although 
this does not exclude their 
collection;  
but 
the PIUs may exchange 
such data among 
themselves. 
Data 
retention 
period 
3.5 years – if the data have 
not been manually 
accessed during that 
period, they will be 
destroyed; 
11.5 years – if accessed 
the data will be transferred 
to a deleted record file 
where they will remain for 
8 years before they are 
destroyed. 
 
15 years – after 7 years the 
data will be moved to a 
dormant, non-operational 
status; data in a dormant 
status will be retained for 
8 years. 
6-10 years – 3 years after 
their transfer and a further 
period of 3-7 years in 
archives; after that period, 
data should be deleted 
from the database. 
Number of 
data items 
34  34 (only 19 enumerated 
explicitly)  
Same as in the PNR III 
                                                      
33 IATA refers to the International Air Transport Association. 
34 Most of the differences can be explained with the complexity of EU decision-making procedures and 
the fact that various countries insisted on different provisions being inserted. Hence, for instance, the data 
retention period may vary from six to ten years. THE INFLUENCE OF THE US ON THE EU’S DATA PROTECTION REGIME | 7 
 
Table 1. cont’d 
Access to 
data by data 
subjects and 
redress 
mechanisms 
Access – yes but it is 
conditional; 
Redress – the CBP will 
undertake to rectify data at 
the request of passengers 
and crewmembers, air 
carriers or data protection 
authorities in the EU 
member states (to the 
extent specifically 
authorised by the data 
subject), where the CBP 
determines that such data 
is contained in its database 
and a correction is 
justified and properly 
supported. 
 
Access and redress – yes 
but it is conditional; 
The PNR III extended 
administrative protections 
under the Privacy Act to 
PNR data stored in the 
Automated Targeting 
System (ATS), regardless 
of the nationality or 
country of residence of the 
data subject. 
 
Access – yes, but member 
states may adopt 
legislative measures 
restricting access to 
information; 
Rectification and erasure 
rights are provided but no 
organisation/body in 
particular is appointed as 
to deal with such requests; 
The data subject must 
have the right to seek 
judicial remedy for any 
breach. 
Reciprocity 
of data 
transfers 
No – the CBP shall, 
strictly on the basis of 
reciprocity, encourage 
US-based airlines to 
cooperate. 
No – the DHS intends, 
strictly on the basis of 
reciprocity, to actively 
promote the cooperation 
of the airlines within the 
jurisdictions of the EU. 
Yes – if specific 
conditions are met, 
including purpose, 
adequate level of data 
protection, etc.; in 
addition, in some instances 
there is no need for a 
decision on adequacy. 
Source: Author’s compilation based on Council of the European Union (2004), (2007a) and (2009).  
Throughout the process of the EU–US PNR negotiations, major frictions arose with respect to 
the purpose of the agreement, the retention period, redress mechanisms and transfers of 
sensitive data.
35 The data retention period proposed in the Agreement (according to the US, at 
least seven to eight years) was problematic because, as argued by the Article 29 Working Party, 
it was “doubtful whether an excessively long data retention time with regard to millions of 
individuals can be effective for investigative purposes. …Data should only be retained for a 
short period that should not exceed some weeks or even months following the entry to the US. 
A period of 7-8 years cannot be considered as justified.”
36 In addition, the list of 34 items of 
data to be collected was regarded as excessive, given that “no evidence or explanation has been 
provided about how their processing could be deemed to be necessary, proportionate and not 
excessive in a democratic society for combating terrorism”.
37 
The European Commission initially subscribed to many of these criticisms but during the 
negotiations it softened its positions and proposed similar solutions to be introduced in the EU 
PNR system. Although the process and the content of the EU system differ from the American 
                                                      
35 Sensitive data is that which may reveal race, ethnic origin or religious belief – the transfer of which is 
prohibited by the Directive 95/46/EC as a matter of principle. 
36 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2004 on the adequate protection of personal data 
contained in the PNR of air passengers to be transferred to the United States’ Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection (US CBP), 10019/04/EN, Brussels, WP 87, 29 January 2004. 
37 Ibid. 8 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
one, the result is still very similar to the final PNR Agreement negotiated with the US in 2007 
(Table 1). In many instances, the scope of the EU provisions goes even farther than the EU–US 
PNR Agreement, which may suggest that the Commission used the momentum provided by the 
EU–US negotiations to advance its own controversial measures.
38  
The revised version of the proposal presented in January 2009 additionally includes provisions 
allowing member states “to provide, under their domestic law, for a system of collection and 
handling of PNR data for other purposes than those specified in this Framework decision”.
39 
The data collected by passenger information units (PIUs) in member states should be used to 
carry out “real time risk assessment of the passengers in order to identify the persons who may 
be involved in a terrorist offence or serious crime and who require further examination by the 
competent authorities of the Member State”.
40 The PNR data will be processed against relevant 
databases and the risk criteria for the assessment will be provided under national laws. The 
problem is that each of the national PIUs will have the freedom to determine what constitutes a 
risk. The difference in risk assessment methods may form an obstacle to the freedom of 
movement in the EU. For instance, the same person may be prevented from boarding a flight to 
Belgium but be allowed on a flight to Germany. That is why Austria, Portugal, Slovakia and 
Luxembourg pleaded in favour of some degree of harmonisation with regard to the risk 
assessment.  
Furthermore, Art. 8 of the EU PNR proposal stipulates that “PNR data and the analysis of PNR 
data may be transferred or made available by a member state to a third country only on a case-
by-case basis” and only if certain conditions are met, including the necessity of such a transfer 
and an adequate level of protection for the intended data processing in that third country. In the 
case of onward transfers (i.e. when one member state wants to make available data received 
from another member state), the permission of the member state from which the data originates 
is required.  
It is obvious, however, that ‘the shadow of the future’ will make authorities cooperate, i.e. they 
will be reluctant to refuse a request for information in case they might need similar data in the 
future. Even more worrying is the derogation from this principle provided in Art. 8.2, which 
stipulates that “data may be transferred to a third country without the prior consent of the 
Member State from which the data was obtained only if the transfer of the data is essential for 
the prevention of an immediate and serious threat”. The question that remains is this: What does 
“immediate and serious threat” mean? 
Other than content issues, the proceedings of the European Commission have resembled the 
American unilateral approach to the whole issue. One of the major criticisms raised by the EU 
with respect to the EU–US PNR was the lack of consultation or any discussion about the 
intentions of the US. Yet, while aware of the international implications of the system, the EU 
has not held discussions with its international partners.
41 Although intensive dialogue continues 
with developed countries such as the US, Canada and Australia, very little discussion is taking 
place between EU authorities and their counterparts in Eastern Europe or other countries where 
these instruments would apply. 
                                                      
38 D. Bigo and S. Carrera, From New York to Madrid: Technology as the Ultra-Solution to the Permanent 
State of Fear and Emergency in the EU, CEPS Commentary, CEPS, Brussels, 17 February 2007 
(retrieved from http://ceps01.link.be/Article.php?article_id=314).  
39 Art. 7a, Council of the European Union (2009), op. cit. 
40 Ibid., Art. 3(3b). 
41 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG RELEX, Brussels, February 
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3.  How did we get here? Explaining the American influence 
The objective of the US homeland security strategy is to detect, prevent and defeat any potential 
threats to American citizens.
42 To achieve it, the US approach focuses on ensuring that 
international security regulations provide for effective counterterrorism activities, and as 
deemed necessary, on improving regulatory standards in the territories of other countries.
43 This 
approach has further enhanced the US impact on transatlantic and EU security, mostly through 
its role as an agenda-setter and catalyst. At the same time, the increasing cooperation on 
homeland security has enhanced the role of some actors while sidelining others. The policy-
making process has become dominated by informal networks and personal relationships, which 
have strengthened the mutual learning and trust-building dimensions of the EU–US homeland 
security cooperation. The following sections address these aspects in more detail. 
3.1  The US as a catalyst and agenda-setter 
The increasing focus on homeland security policies in the US has provided an impulse for the 
development and implementation of EU actions in this field. Many EU officials have confirmed 
that the post-9/11 developments in the US have had a spillover effect in Europe and created a 
window of opportunity for advancing security cooperation at the EU level. For instance, even 
though many policy proposals were presented in the Tampere conclusions, their implementation 
has progressed only since 2001. As one of the officials from the Directorate-General for 
External Relations (DG RELEX) put it, the EU was “unprepared” to work with the US mostly 
because the security consciousness did not develop as rapidly as it did in the US.
44 This also 
partly explains the big influence that the US has had on the transatlantic and EU security 
agendas. 
A study of the progress achieved in the framework of the New Transatlantic Agenda and the 
Action Plan of 1995 demonstrates that the US was more effective in pursuing its own security 
objectives in the transatlantic context, and de facto shaped the EU policy agenda in this field.
45 
From 2001 onwards, US efforts accelerated, coupled with increased engagement on the part of 
                                                      
42 The White House, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Office for Homeland Security, 
Washington, D.C., July, 2002(b). 
43 Transnational regulation (as this practice is called in the academic literature) has its sources in the 
reciprocal interdependencies among actors (i.e. in areas of trade or security). More specifically, the focus 
on transnational regulation may stem from several concerns, including the achievement of a competitive 
advantage or to avoid a situation whereby such advantage is gained by the other side (K.W. Abbott and D. 
Snidal, “International ‘standards’ and international governance”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 
8, No. 3, 2001; D. Lazer, “Regulatory interdependence and international governance”, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2001). It may also relate to gaining market access and economies 
of scale (K. Nicolaidis and M.P. Egan, “Transnational market governance and regional policy externality: 
Why recognize foreign standards?”, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 8, No. 3, 2001) or accessing 
the information spreading through numerous informational networks (Lazer, 2001, op. cit.; M.L. Djelic, 
“Social networks and country-to-country transfer: Dense and weak ties in the diffusion of knowledge”, 
Socio-Economic Review, Vol. 2, 2004; M.L. Djelic and K. Sahlin-Andersson (eds), Transnational 
governance: Institutional dynamics of regulation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). In the 
case of international homeland security, the major reason for the development of transnational regulation 
has been to avoid regulatory imbalances and the emergence of ‘safe heavens’, which would mean 
increased insecurity for all parties.  
44 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG RELEX, Brussels, March 2009. 
45 J. Peterson, H. Wallace, M.A. Pollack, R. Doherty, F. Burwell, J.P. Quinlan and A. Young, Review of 
the framework for relations between the European Union and the United States: An independent study, 
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the EU. Still, looking at the issues put on the agenda by EU representatives (i.e. data protection, 
visas and biometric identifiers), the reactive nature of their approach is noticeable. In most cases 
where the EU has shown interest, it has been dictated by the need to respond to American 
legislation. This argument coincides with that presented by Statewatch in its bulletin of 2007, 
where authors argue that “the ‘US/EU channel’ is largely a ‘one-way street’ for US demands. It 
is rarely used by the EU to meet its needs and when it does it faces intransigency.”
46 Therefore, 
it can be argued that the US has contributed to raising awareness in the EU of several security 
issues that were earlier beyond the EU agenda. 
The US officials are convinced that for the EU, it has also been the occasion to prove itself and 
improve its international standing. As suggested by one of the US officials in the Department of 
State, “one should not underestimate the attention that the EU wants to get from the US”.
47 For 
that reason, when presiding over the European Council, Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt asked 
the American representatives to suggest issues on which both sides could enhance cooperation 
against terrorism. Since “nobody wanted to prepare this list”, it was eventually drafted in 
Washington and sent for dissemination in Brussels. The list prepared for the Commission 
President Romano Prodi was leaked to the media and publicised as the “49 American 
demands”.
48 Presented in the EU as “a sweeping agenda covering unregulated and 
unaccountable powers affecting criminal investigations, suspects’ rights, the retention of 
telecommunications data, border controls and asylum policies”, this letter created many 
problems. In the aftermath, the US had to organise several separate meetings because “people 
from [the] first and third pillar[s] did not want to sit in the same room”.
49 Although this situation 
has had a limited impact on EU–US cooperation, it has clearly demonstrated that American 
involvement in EU security policies remains a sensitive topic and almost taboo. 
3.2  New actors and informal networks 
The bilateral cooperation between the EU and the US has developed in the framework of the 
New Transatlantic Agenda of 1995, which – through the process of summits, senior-level group 
meetings, task forces and civil society dialogues – has been expected to provide a suitable 
environment for the advancement of transatlantic relations. Initially, membership in these 
bodies was mostly limited to diplomats and trade specialists from both sides, with the ad hoc 
presence of specialists on other topics if the agenda of a meeting so required.  
The growing external exposure of once internally-oriented agencies and services (i.e. in the US 
these were Customs and Border Protection and the Department of Justice) resulted in the 
emergence of new actors and their constellations. Currently, the issues related to the fight 
against terrorism are dispersed across the EU among several institutions and directorates-
general in the European Commission, including the DG for Justice, Freedom and Security (DG 
JFS), the DG for Transportation and Energy (TREN), the DG for Taxation and Customs Union 
(TAXUD) and DG RELEX.
50 Although some of them have acted at the international level in the 
                                                      
46 Statewatch, “EU/US security ‘channel’ – A one-way street?”, Statewatch Bulletin, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2007 
(retrieved from www.statewatch.eu). 
47 Derived from an interview with a former US official, Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 
2007. 
48 The text of this letter is available on the Statewatch website (http://www.statewatch.org). 
49 Derived from an interview with a former US official, Department of State, Washington, D.C., May. See 
also the Statewatch website article at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2001/nov/06Ausalet.htm. 
50 The focus here is mostly on the European Commission, which assumed the leading role in the field of 
homeland security and by its nature is supposed to represent Community interests. Yet, the network of 
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past (DG TAXUD and DG TREN), the scope of their activities has been rather limited. 
Similarly, the DG JFS has developed its international expertise in the context of previous 
enlargements, but it has mostly been the fight against terrorism that has put it in the spotlight 
and contributed to the most dynamic growth of its external activities.
51 Gradually, a small task 
force that had been established to prepare third countries for EU membership became an 
extensive policy unit.
52 Nowadays, all directorates-general involved in various aspects of 
internal security issues have units dealing explicitly with external relations and individual 
officers responsible solely for contacts with the US (which used to be the domain of the DG 
RELEX). 
In time, the predominantly diplomatic representation in the meetings began to provoke unease 
among the homeland security professionals – dubbed ‘securocrats’ by this author – who 
questioned the qualifications of trained diplomats in areas of law enforcement, counterterrorism, 
etc.
53 As the agenda increasingly included homeland security issues, these fora became 
overcrowded and ineffective.
54 Their formality and structure of membership led the securocrats 
to establish their own specialised and more informal bodies,
55 with the objective of ensuring that 
those doing conceptual thinking on either side actually talked to one another.
56 The emergence 
of networks with more organisational and cultural homogeneity
57 between EU and American 
officials provided a new dynamism at the transatlantic level and proceeded simultaneously to 
engender more inter-organisational rivalries and conflicts.  
                                                                                                                                                            
CHALLENGE Research Group, “Mapping of the European Security Agencies”, CERI/Sciences Po-
CNRS, Paris, 2008 (retrieved from www.libertysecurity.org/article1670.html). 
51 According to a former EU official from the DG JFS, initially the unit was mostly engaged in the 
enlargement negotiations and prepared the Commission’s position on issues of justice and home affairs. 
Gradually, many issues resolved during the enlargement process (although not explicitly covered by the 
acquis communautaire) became the subject of cooperation with third countries, i.e. capacity building of 
the judiciary, police cooperation and border control. Consequently, the European Council at Feira in 2000 
asked the European Commission to present a communication on the external dimension of EU justice and 
home affairs (derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG RELEX, Brussels, 
March 2007). 
52 For more on the development of the external dimension of justice and home affairs policies, see P. 
Pawlak, “The External Dimension of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Hijacker or Hostage of 
Cross-pillarization?”, Journal of European Integration, Vol. 31, No. 1, 2009(a), pp. 25-44; see also S. 
Alegre, The EU’s External Cooperation in Criminal Justice and Counter-terrorism: An Assessment of the 
Human Rights Implications with a Particular Focus on Cooperation with Canada, CEPS Special Report, 
CEPS, Brussels, September 2008. 
53 One of them raised a rhetorical question: “Do diplomats understand anything about security?” Derived 
from an interview with a European Commission official, EU Delegation, Washington, D.C., February 
2007. 
54 P. Pawlak, “From Hierarchy to Networks: Transatlantic Governance of Homeland Security”, Journal of 
Global Change and Governance, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2007(a). 
55 It is noteworthy that the US is the only major partner of the EU with whom there is no overlapping 
legal framework to regulate the relationship. Both the New Transatlantic Agenda and the most recent 
developments are taking place based on political declarations, with the exception of sectoral EU–US 
international agreements. Still, bodies like task forces or high-level dialogues exist and have a limited 
basis in the EU Treaties. 
56 See Pawlak (2007a). 
57 For more on the issue of homogeneity in transatlantic networks, see P. Pawlak, “Network politics and 
transatlantic homeland security cooperation”, Perspectives on European Politics and Society, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, Special Issue, 2009(b), forthcoming in December. 12 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
In 2004, the EU and US agreed to create the above-mentioned PDBTS. It was intended as an 
early warning mechanism, to facilitate discussion of controversial legislation before it provoked 
conflict. The initiative came from the homeland security professionals, who – constrained by the 
existing diplomatic channels – felt the need to move their cooperation beyond the platforms of 
diplomatic ‘talking shops’ and instead focus more on results.
58 Since the PDBTS was created 
outside the formal EU institutional framework,
59 it was able to develop flexibility in terms of its 
format, membership and functioning. Moreover, because it did not constitute part of a formal 
negotiation process but rather a forum for exchange of information, the PDBTS allowed for 
more frank discussions. As Jonathan Faull, director-general of the DG JFS, said during a press 
conference after the first meeting of the PDBTS, its participants have “deliberately decided to 
avoid the usual pleasantries and long speeches and reading of documents which everybody 
should have read, no doubt, has read anyway. But we got down to brass tacks very quickly. 
These are issues of the greatest importance for the security of citizens of the European Union 
and of the United States.”
60 Several rounds of PDBTS meetings have proven a good opportunity 
for EU and American policy-makers not only to resolve persistent problems, but also to learn 
more about each other and exchange information, and they have consequently contributed to 
building trust and relationships.
61  
3.3  Learning and building trust 
Since the transfer of data to the US authorities represented a breach of EU data protection laws, 
the only option for the European Commission was to establish whether the US data protection 
system was ‘adequate’ by EU standards and only then give the green light to the airlines. This 
task was difficult not only owing to differences between the EU and American approaches to 
data protection, but also to the entire transatlantic context (i.e. the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
and the controversies over Guantanamo and extraordinary renditions). 
One of the problems that emerged at the transatlantic level in the post-9/11 context was the 
limited trust between policy-makers on both sides and the role of emotions in the process. When 
asked about the most challenging aspects of transatlantic security cooperation, one of the EU 
officials suggested that “people’s reciprocal fears, interests and emotions are important and need 
to be taken into account. They definitely do not make things easier. …Homeland security is 
more than business and profits. That is why it is more challenging.”
62 Initially, the presence of 
new actors at the transatlantic level proved difficult – mostly because it was the first time many 
of them had met.
63 Nevertheless, the cultural and organisational proximity among some 
                                                      
58 Ibid. 
59 ‘Formal’ in this sense means based on treaties or other interinstitutional arrangements. 
60 The US Mission to the European Union (2004), US, EU discuss transportation, border security, 
Brussels, 27 April (retrieved from http://useu.usmission.gov/Article.asp?ID=3B93FC1F-F30E-467D-
A287-54777BE14CE7). 
61 Derived from interviews with EU and US officials, October 2006–July 2007. 
62 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG External Relations, Brussels, 
October 2006. Similar views prevailed among officials interviewed for the purpose of this research. For 
instance, another person described the problem in the following way: “Because we are dealing with the 
US, a lot of debates are rather embedded in a broader political context and therefore become very 
emotional. The subject as such is already important but [the] emotions involved make the whole issue 
even more difficult.”  
63 One of the US officials referring to his first experiences with the EU had this comment: “First, it was 
[an] educational problem. I came from the Congress and there we were not worried about the EU at all. 
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individuals very soon led to the emergence of new coalitions, most notably of internal security 
officials. The progressive emergence of trust and relationships among them has allowed the 
cooperation to move beyond the formality of international law instruments. 
The issue was complicated because from the beginning the data protection authorities in 
member states and the European Parliament took a very strict stand on the US requirements. In 
one of its early opinions (2002), the Article 29 Working Party expressed the view that “it does 
not seem acceptable that a unilateral decision taken by a third country for reasons of its own 
public interest should lead to the routine and wholesale transfer of data protected under the 
directive”.
64 In the same opinion, it was argued that because the data forwarded by airlines 
related to identifiable physical persons and was processed by airlines within the EU, they were 
protected by the provisions of the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC). Therefore, access to 
passenger data violated the EC Regulation on computer reservation systems as well as the 1995 
Data Protection Directive.
65 Criticism was also expressed of the purpose and proportionality of 
the measures adopted. While data protection authorities recognised the need to combat 
terrorism, they also underlined that “the respect for fundamental rights and freedoms of the 
individuals including the right to privacy and data protection must be ensured”.
66 In June 2003, 
the Article 29 Working Party reiterated that “the legitimate requirements of internal security in 
the United States of America may not interfere with these fundamental principles”.
67  
A similar position was taken in resolutions and reports of the European Parliament. The 
European Parliament resolution of 2003 raised a number of issues that in their opinion were not 
satisfactorily resolved and therefore needed further discussion. The European Parliament 
presented several objections: the scope of the agreement was unclear, the request for access to 
39 data items seemed “excessive and under all circumstances out of proportion” and the data 
retention period of six or seven years was “unjustified”, especially in the cases of those persons 
who “do not present any risk to the country’s security”.
68 Aware of the implications of the 
negotiated deal, in its resolution of 2004 the European Parliament stated that it was “extremely 
important that the outcome of the negotiations [was] not [to] be taken as a model for the EU’s 
further work on the development of its own anti-crime measures, data storage and protection of 
confidentiality”.
69  
                                                                                                                                                            
Derived from an interview with a former US official of the Department of Homeland Security, 
Washington, D.C., May 2007. 
64 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2002 on transmission of passenger manifest 
information and other data from airlines to the United States, 11647/02/EN, WP 66, Brussels, 24 October 
2002. 
65 Ibid. 
66 This stems not only form the Directive but also from the Art. 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Arts. 7 and 8 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. See Article 29 
Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 10/2001 on the need for a balanced approach in the fight against 
terrorism, 0901/02/EN/Final, WP 53, 14 December 2001. 
67 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 4/2003 on the level of protection ensured in the US 
for the transfer of passengers’ data, 11070/03/EN, WP 78, Brussels, 13 June 2003. 
68 European Parliament, Resolution on transfer of personal data by airlines in the case of transatlantic 
flights: State of negotiations with the USA, P5_TA-PROV(2003)0429, 8 October 2003(a). 
69 European Parliament, Resolution on the draft Commission decision noting the adequate level of 
protection provided for personal data contained in the Passenger Name Records (PNRs) transferred to the 
US Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 2004/2011(INI), P5_TA-PROV(2004)0245, 2004. 14 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
In light of such extensive opposition, the adequacy decision of the European Commission
70 with 
respect to the US was a surprising move. Given that the US Customs and Border Protection was 
asked to provide additional safeguards, a conclusion can be reached that the decision 
establishing the adequacy of the American data protection system was politically motivated 
rather than based on an objective assessment. Even more interesting is the evolution of this 
‘quasi-legal’ instrument from the Undertakings in 2004
71 and the letter to the Council 
presidency and the Commission from the DHS in 2006,
72 to the US letter to the EU 
accompanying the PNR Agreement of 2007.
73  
The outcome of the 2004 negotiations was puzzling because it was a hybrid composed of a 
rather loose international agreement and very detailed Undertakings, presented in the form of a 
political commitment rather than a legally binding document. Bearing in mind that the most 
contentious provisions of the entire package were incorporated in the Undertakings (i.e. the use 
of PNR data, data requirements, storage and methods of accessing the data), it was surprising 
that the EU agreed to such a weak form. According to its text, the Undertakings make up a 
unilateral declaration of the US Customs and Border Protection to follow certain principles and 
rules with regard to the treatment of PNR data. Thus, the Undertakings constitute a 
complementary act with the objective of providing additional guarantees for the EU. The 
outcome, although slightly uncomfortable for lawyers and unsatisfactory from an international 
law perspective, was considered a necessity from the political perspective.
74  
During the PNR negotiations in 2006 and 2007, similar provisions to those in the Undertakings 
were included in the format of letters ‘from the US to the EU’. Since the legal basis for the 
agreement transferred from the first pillar to the third pillar (i.e. which is beyond the scope of 
the EU Data Protection Directive and hence not subject to the ‘adequacy finding’ procedure), 
this exchange of letters was meant to serve as a commitment of both sides to respect one 
another’s data protection regime. The following except is drawn from a reply from the EU to the 
US:  
While taking note of the content of your letter, we wish to reaffirm the importance that 
the EU and its Member States attach to respect for fundamental rights, in particular to 
the protection of personal data. The commitments of DHS to continue to implement the 
Undertakings allow the EU to deem that, for purposes of the implementation of the 
Agreement, it ensures an adequate level of data protection.
75  
This reliance upon soft modes of regulation rather than on formal legal arrangements is an 
interesting and important development. It demonstrates that informal contracts have 
increasingly compensated or substituted the formal contractual safeguards, which in the light of  
 
                                                      
70 European Commission, Decision 2004/535/EC of 14 May 2004 on the adequate protection of personal 
data contained in the Passenger Name Record of air passengers transferred to the United States’ Bureau 
of Customs and Border Protection, OJ L 235, Brussels, 06.07.2004. 
71 Department of Homeland Security, Undertakings of the Department of Homeland Security Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), DHS, Washington, D.C., 11 May 2004(a). 
72 Council of the European Union, Letter to the Council Presidency and the Commission from the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) of the United States of America, concerning the interpretation 
of certain provisions of the Undertakings issued by DHS on 11 May 2004 in connection with the transfer 
by air carriers of Passenger Name Record (PNR) data, 13738/06, Brussels, 11 October 2006. 
73 Council of the European Union (2007a), op. cit. 
74 Derived from an interview with a US official, Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 2007. 
75 Council of the European Union, Reply by the Council Presidency and the Commission to the letter 
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empirical evidence can be interpreted as a sign of learning and increasing trust among the 
parties. For instance, when commenting on the PDBTS, Jonathan Faull had the following 
observation:  
There is no doubt that we share one hundred percent the same objectives in making our 
borders secure, making our transport systems secure and in striking the right balance 
between the security measures and the rights of the individual and the protection of 
data. Those are our objectives. I think they are absolutely common. We have different 
legal systems, different political structures, so the way[s] we get there are not always 
the same. But the more we talk to each other, the more likely it is that we will find 
common paths to that common destination.
76 
Similarly, Tom Ridge, former US secretary for Homeland Security, reflected on these 
developments in the following way:  
What I have discovered is that when we sit down, make our case, discuss, negotiate 
finding a common solution of mutual benefit, we’ve made a lot of progress. Part of me 
wishes we’d started that a little bit earlier, but there were other things that it seemed at 
the time were higher priorities.
77 
Some officials also believe that “those [at] the top are having better contacts between 
themselves and are more open to pragmatic discussion”,
78 which has helped to transform the 
American “bunker mentality”
79 into a more open one. 
3.4  The development of personal relationships 
The role of this dialogue and the personal relationships established between officials on both 
sides of the Atlantic cannot be underestimated. Personal relations “make a really great deal” and 
help to “push things forward”.
80 Their role has been acknowledged at the highest political 
levels.
81 Personal and informal relationships that developed between the EU and American 
officials through participation in the same fora created an environment for more informal 
discussion about transatlantic data exchange and data protection. Dialogues and interpersonal 
relationships have also had an impact on building a common understanding and empathy among 
officials involved in the process. This was needed because initially each side found it “[difficult] 
to see and understand” the other’s perspective.
82 Since “privacy is not easy to understand”, 
dialogues such as those of the PDBTS gave the policy-makers “time to work through concepts”, 
                                                      
76 US Mission to the European Union (2004), op. cit. 
77 Department of Homeland Security, Transcript of Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge, DHS, 
Washington, D.C., 30 November 2004(b) (retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_ 
release_0562.shtm). 
78 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG Transport and Energy, Brussels, 
March 2007. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Derived from an interview with a Council Secretariat official, Brussels, March 2007. For an example of 
how individuals and broken relationships may have a negative impact on socialisation and the 
relationship at large, see Pawlak (2007b), op. cit. One of the officials, for instance, mentioned that “the 
attitude” towards Europeans was expressed, among others, in conducting negotiations in very limited 
spaces and “terrible” conditions. 
81 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG External Relations, Brussels, 
October 2006. 
82 Derived from an interview with a former privacy officer, Department of Homeland Security, 
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along with a chance to clarify “differences in language” and “to listen to each other more and 
get a better understanding”.
83 
Similar objectives were behind the creation of the High-Level Contact Group (HLCG) on data 
protection. Established by the decision of the EU–US Justice and Home Affairs Ministerial 
Troika on 6 November 2006, the HLCG started its work as an informal advisory group bringing 
together EU and US policy-makers (i.e. senior officials from the Commission, the Council 
presidency supported by the Council Secretariat and the US Departments of Justice, Homeland 
Security and State). The DG JFS, represented by both security and data protection specialists, was the 
leading actor on the EU side.  
The HLCG was intended to provide broader reflection on the methods that would allow for 
effective law enforcement cooperation while at the same time ensure a high level of data 
protection. It was an opportunity for EU and American policy-makers to enhance their mutual 
understanding of working methods, progress towards “common principles” and eventually 
establish “an effective regime for privacy and personal data protection”.
84 A set of core privacy 
and personal data protection principles was identified during the first meeting of the group on 
26 February 2007, and another informal expert group was set up with the aim of developing 
agreed definitions of those principles.
85 Operationally, the expert group and the HLCG relied mostly 
on videoconferences and electronic transfers of documents. Draft documents were exchanged between 
the two sides ahead of videoconferences and then thoroughly discussed. Political leaders endorsed 
the final report of the HLCG at the EU–US summit in 2008.  
The history of the HLCG would be incomplete without mentioning the role that individuals and 
personal relationships between EU and US officials played in the creation of this group. The 
HLCG emerged from the PDBTS as a new, even more specialised body. The idea came from a 
former official at the US Department of Justice based in Brussels, Mark Richard, and was 
implemented thanks to his close relationship with Gilles de Kerchove at the Council Secretariat. 
They were both involved in the negotiations of the PNR agreements and in the SWIFT talks. 
They also both agreed that many problems during the process emerged from a limited 
knowledge of one another’s data protection systems rather than from differences between 
them.
86 Therefore, the new informal group was “an attempt to take privacy out of the 
negotiation context and try to look at issues objectively”.
87 This forum, bringing together data 
protection specialists from both sides of the Atlantic, operates beyond any formal institutional 
mandate and relies fully on informal contracts among its members.  
The emergence of personal relationships among officials led to two other noteworthy 
developments at the transatlantic level. First, the traditional dividing line between the EU on one 
side and the US on the other side has faded and given rise to a more complex set of functional 
dichotomies between the legislative and executive branches or between diplomats and security 
professionals. The differences of approach and objectives of these groups have sometimes 
fostered a new dynamic in transatlantic relations, as in the case of the EU–US PNR Agreement. 
                                                      
83 Derived from an interview with a US official, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., 
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84 Council of the European Union, Final Report by EU-US High-Level Contact Group on information 
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More importantly, the emergence of the PDBTS as a new body in the EU–US policy-making 
architecture and the resulting shift from a formal negotiation context to a more informal and less 
transparent environment has strengthened the objections of those stakeholders who were denied 
access to the process. The outcomes stemming from the conflicts surrounding the process have 
eventually affected the final policy, which in the case of the EU–US PNR Agreement moved the 
agreement from the Community’s first pillar (as was the case of the PNR I Agreement) to the 
third pillar (as is the case of the PNR III Agreement).
88  
Personal ties between policy-makers on both sides of the Atlantic have also contributed to the 
surfacing of issue-based transatlantic coalitions, in which each side has supported the other in 
their domestic struggles. For instance, EU officials have talked with the US Congress and 
presented arguments in support of the position taken by the DHS,
89 while the DHS has talked 
with member states and the European Parliament and presented arguments in support of the 
stance taken by the Commission or Council. Second, personal relationships between the EU and 
US officials have had an impact on the evolution of particular legal and policy instruments. The 
reliance on soft regulation with flexible interpretation and a ‘quasi-legal’ framing of matters of 
great importance and sensitivity, such as the exchange of personal data, undoubtedly represents 
an interesting development. 
4.  What future for the EU data protection regime? 
The progressive reliance on personal data and the exchange of such data for law enforcement 
purposes poses several challenges for global data protection and security. The transposition of 
existing data protection rules that were primarily set up for commercial purposes into a new, 
security-oriented policy context has proven particularly difficult. The discussion in previous 
sections reveals several elements that have important implications for the future of the EU data 
protection regime and the role of the EU in setting global data-protection rules. Numerous 
questions persist about the legal and political construction of the EU data protection system and 
its potential evolution, the role of stakeholders in the policy-making process, and finally the 
transparency and legitimacy of the process itself. 
4.1 Legal  issues 
The conclusions reached by the HLCG read that the EU and US concur on an international 
agreement on data exchange as a preferred option for regulating transatlantic cooperation in this 
field.
90 In view of the US preference for soft laws and flexibility as expressed during earlier 
negotiations, this outcome is unexpected unless one takes into account a more general context 
                                                      
88 For a more extensive discussion, see Pawlak (2009a). 
89 A very good example in this respect is the debate about the H.R. 1 Act (Implementing the 9/11 
Commission Recommendations Act of 2007) assuming 100% screening of containers. 
90 The report of the HLCG and the summit conclusions of May 2008 were further endorsed in December 
2008 in a special political declaration issued by EU and US officials:  
In order to ensure the continuation of law enforcement exchanges and practices between the 
United States and the European Union, both sides state that they are guided by the principles 
described above, on which consensus has been reached, until such time as a binding 
international agreement is concluded and without prejudice to outstanding issues to be further 
explored in that context.  
Still, the statement included in the conclusions of the HLCG leaves the outcome open. See Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), Statement on Information Sharing and Privacy and Personal Data Protection 
between the European Union and the United States of America, DHS, Washington, D.C., 12 December 
2008(b) (retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/international/gc_1229359375601.shtm#0). 18 | PATRYK PAWLAK 
 
and accepts that “there are ways to write things that mask the ambiguity”.
91 While the US may 
still prefer soft regulation, which allows for more flexibility, the developments in the EU and 
uncertainties that they create complicate the discussion and prolong the entire process. Two issues are 
particularly significant: the application of the adequacy principle in the Framework Decision on data 
protection in the third pillar and the provision of an effective mechanism for judicial redress. 
One of the reasons the US advocated an international agreement was adoption by the EU of the 
Framework Decision on the protection of personal data.
92 The Framework Decision applies to 
cross-border exchanges of personal data in the context of police and judicial cooperation. The 
rules for the transfer of data to third countries and international bodies rely on the same 
principle of adequacy as that of the EU Data Protection Directive of 1995. This means that such 
transfers are allowed if “the third State or international body concerned ensures an adequate 
level of protection for the intended data processing”.
93 The determination of adequacy requires a 
decision by each member state that allows the EU states to negotiate a higher level of safeguards 
for protecting personal data than those established in the Framework Directive. That would 
subject the US to discussions with 27 countries with different data protection laws. The American side 
wanted to avoid any potential delays caused by the discussion about the adequacy of the US data 
protection system (as had occurred with the EU–US PNR Agreement), and hence they proposed the 
conclusion of an international agreement. 
The adequacy principle included in that document and the impact of the Directive on global data 
sharing remain very problematic for the US, which describes it as an “ineffective and unworkable 
policy” that might cause a “potential disaster for the global war on terror”.
94 The opposition of the US 
to the EU’s principle of adequacy questions the EU approach to data protection and undermines it 
internationally. As observed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy at the Department of 
Homeland Security, Paul Rosenzweig, “the EU should reconsider its decision to apply notions of 
adequacy to the critical area of law enforcement and public safety. Otherwise, the EU runs the very real 
risk of turning itself into a self-imposed island, isolated from the very allies it needs.”
95 
Another issue that remains unresolved is the question of judicial redress. The construction of the 
American data protection system (through the Privacy Act of 1974) does not provide for foreigners to 
initiate a judicial procedure in US courts. This situation can be remedied only through a change in the 
US law, which is a sole competence of the US Congress. For that to take place, the impulse would 
need to come from a very high political level, but there few chances of this happening. A study 
prepared by the General Accountability Office (the investigative body of the US Congress) in 2008 
                                                      
91 Derived from an interview with a US official, Department of State, Washington D.C., February 2009. 
92 The Decision was adopted by the Council and published in the Official Journal on 30 December 2008 
with the implementation deadline set for 27 November 2010. See Council of the European Union, 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in 
the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ L 350, 30.12.2008(a). 
93 See Art. 13(1d). Art. 14 provides a further explanation of how adequacy will be assessed:  
The adequacy of the level of protection referred to in paragraph 1(d) shall be assessed in the 
light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation or a set of data transfer 
operations. Particular consideration shall be given to the nature of the data, the purpose and 
duration of the proposed processing operation or operations, the State of origin and the State or 
international body of final destination of the data, the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in 
force in the third State or international body in question and the professional rules and security 
measures which apply. 
94 P. Rosenzweig, “Seven questions for the European Union”, Privacy & Security Law Report, Vol. 6, No. 
46, 2007. 
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outlined several proposals for how to update the Privacy Act but none of them included the possibility 
of access to US courts by non-Americans. Still, to address the EU’s concerns, the US proposed 
establishing an administrative process that would constitute an effective redress mechanism for EU 
citizens. This option was rejected by the EU side, which insists on ‘judicial’ rather than ‘effective’ 
redress. 
The direction taken by the EU and US departs from a general practice of mutual recognition of 
agreements. This is because of the EU concept of an ‘adequacy finding’, which makes the process 
more unilateral than reciprocal (i.e. the EU determines the adequacy of another data protection system 
rather than both sides recognising one another’s systems). This concept is controversial in the US for 
several reasons and increasingly faces opposition. More and more, American policy-makers are raising 
the following question: Is the EU data protection system adequate with respect to ours? Therefore, any 
future EU–US agreement will most probably bear some resemblance to a mutual recognition 
agreement to ensure that the process is reciprocal.  
4.2 Governance  issues 
The participation of the legislative branch in the debate seems primarily to be an EU problem. 
The US political system gives the executive clear competence in the field of foreign policy, 
which is not always the case in the EU. The ambiguity of the EU decision-making procedures 
and a blurring divide between the internal and external aspects of policies make the process 
complicated. These characteristics have ramifications on the transatlantic partnership, as was 
evident in EU–US PNR Agreement. The role of the European Parliament also remained 
ambiguous with respect to the HLCG. While members of the European Parliament did not 
participate in the meetings, it was the understanding of the US side that the European 
Commission would “make sure that things on their side were working”,
96 including 
communication with the European Parliament and other stakeholders. But that did not prevent 
the European Parliament, data protection authorities or the Article 29 Working Party from 
seeking information directly from the US – a situation that was both “uncomfortable” and 
“ironic” from the US perspective.
97  
The future role of the European Parliament was unclear until recently, owing to the pending 
adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, which had further connotations for the Commission’s negotiation 
mandate. But the ratification of the Treaty by the Czech Republic brings slightly more certitude. Still, 
the new Treaty cuts both ways for the US. The biggest “advantage”
98 in the current institutional and 
legal environment is the limited role of the European Parliament. The adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, 
while simplifying the EU decision-making process, creates a new legal context. The pillar structure 
will disappear and the role of the European Parliament will increase.
99 In addition, the change of the 
European Commission and the European Parliament in the course of 2009 will cost the entire process 
more time. 
Furthermore, although the focus of this paper is on the political dialogue on border security and 
data protection in the transatlantic context, one needs to keep in mind that this is only part of the 
picture. Similar networks have been established among officials dealing with customs security 
                                                      
96 Derived from an interview with a US official, Department of Homeland Security, Washington D.C., 
February 2009. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid. 
99 This is one of the reasons the European Commission has recently decided to accelerate discussions with 
the US regarding the conclusion of a new deal on the SWIFT data transfers. See J. Crosbie, “Commission 
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(the Joint Customs Cooperation Council) and transportation security (the Transportation 
Security Cooperation Group). The idea behind the latter group is mostly to inform one another 
in advance about planned initiatives and to take actions jointly. Consequently, the EU and US 
officials visit airports on both sides of the Atlantic to learn how each side operates and 
eventually to foster mutual trust and recognition of standards.
100 In addition, there are several 
other more informal networks between Europol and FBI officials, between the US Customs and 
Border Protection and EU FRONTEX staff, and among law enforcement officers at operational 
levels. 
Considering the sensibility of the issues, the emergence of such informal channels is not 
surprising. Intelligence cooperation among countries is essentially based on such initiatives. But 
what does it mean for the policy-making process? As already indicated, most of these networks 
only include representatives of the executive with very limited access accorded to legislative 
and data protection bodies. The most recent developments in the EU–US cooperation on data 
exchange confirm the general trends identified in this paper. First, we observe the proliferation 
of informal networks between American and EU policy-makers. These networks operate beyond 
any legal mandate provided in the Treaties and their operations are based on informal 
relationships among individuals. This is best expressed in the introduction by the Czech 
presidency to the HLCG final report: “The Presidency would like to highlight that this draft 
final report as such is not a report by the Council or by the EU, but by the High-Level Contact 
Group.” If the HLCG does not represent the Council or the EU, for whom does it speak? And 
what is the significance of its conclusions? 
The implications of these networks for the EU’s security policies cannot be underestimated. 
While the potential effects of transnational regulation are rather straightforward and can be 
identified rather easily, the processes of building trust and learning in these networks are much 
more difficult to observe. Therefore, they require more careful investigation. On the one hand, 
they provide the opportunity for the exchange of information and learning, which makes any 
discussion “more fair intellectually”.
101 On the other hand, they affect the EU’s internal 
organisation, its working methods and approaches to policies,
102 and hence need to be 
scrutinised.  
5. Policy  recommendations 
As this paper has demonstrated, informal policy-making at the transatlantic level is playing an 
ever-larger role. This can be interpreted as a sign of the integration process progressing outside 
any official framework. Yet, this process suffers from a lack of transparency and dubious 
legitimacy. While it is understandable that some issues need to be discussed behind closed 
doors, the level of secrecy and the number of obstacles to obtaining any related information are 
difficult to justify. It is possible that, as policy-makers claim, the informality and flexibility of 
transatlantic networks allow for working towards more innovative and possibly more efficient 
solutions. But because of the extensive scope of homeland security policies and their 
repercussions for individuals, the information provided to the public should be more detailed 
rather than fragmented and imprecise.  
                                                      
100 Derived from an interview with a European Commission official, DG Transport and Energy, Brussels, 
14 March 2007. 
101 Derived from an interview with a former US official, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, 
D.C., April 2007. 
102 For a discussion of the impact of the internal EU debate about the EU–US PNR Agreement on the 
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The above considerations raise several critical issues that should be addressed in light of the 
discussions underway about the Stockholm Programme. In its Communication to the European 
Parliament and to the Council, the Commission suggests that “[t]he Union must respond to the 
challenge posed by the increasing exchange of personal data and the need for utmost respect for 
the protection of privacy… A comprehensive protection scheme should be introduced.”
103 The 
following sections offer a number of recommendations that might be useful in future 
discussions about the implementation of this objective. The focus is on four elements in 
particular: the place of the citizen in the policy, the transparency and accountability of the 
process, the involvement of crucial stakeholders, and issues of global – including transatlantic – 
governance of data protection.
104 
5.1  Putting the citizen back in the centre of the debate 
Whereas policy-makers see many benefits in the informality of networks and their potential to 
expedite the entire process, there is no doubt that from the perspective of an individual, this 
approach is problematic. The major problem is that the liberty and security of individuals are 
subjected to informal networking processes over which they have no control. Therefore, any 
future endeavours to strengthen the external dimension of security policies (i.e. within the 
Stockholm Programme) should also enhance the provisions about guarantees of fundamental 
rights and civil liberties.
105 Given the prevalence of the security mindset in the European 
Commission and in the Council, this objective could be achieved by giving broader access to 
policy-making to those actors specifically tasked with the protection of civil liberties and data 
protection, including the Fundamental Rights Agency and European Data Protection Supervisor. 
In reference to the US, the EU should not only ‘import’ policies aimed at improving security, 
but also those that strengthen liberty and justice. While the EU is convinced of the supremacy of 
its data protection system,
106 many aspects of the US approach to data protection could be 
beneficial to EU citizens.
107 Two instruments that could be introduced to the EU decision cycles 
are the privacy impact assessments (PIAs) and the System of Record Notices (SORNs). The 
objective of the PIAs is to demonstrate that owners and developers of a specific programme or 
system “consciously incorporate privacy protections throughout the entire system development 
lifecycle”.
108 SORNs, on the other hand, are required for systems operating with personal data. 
                                                      
103 European Commission (2009), op. cit., p. 8. 
104 For a more extensive set of recommendations for a broader Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, see 
E. Guild, S. Carrera and A. Faure-Atger (2009), Challenges and prospects for the EU’s Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice: Recommendations to the European Commission for the Stockholm Programme, 
CEPS Working Paper No. 313, CEPS, Brussels, April 2009; see also E. Guild and S. Carrera, Towards 
the next phase of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: The European Commission’s 
proposals for the Stockholm Programme, CEPS Policy Brief No. 196, CEPS, Brussels, 20 August 2009. 
105 See also the policy recommendations in Guild, Carrera and Faure-Atger (2009), op. cit. 
106 Such a conclusion has been reached after numerous interviews with EU officials. Also, some official 
expert reports prepared by the European Parliament sustain this position. See European Parliament 
(2008), op. cit. 
107 For more information about the US data protection system (not only legal acts but also and most 
importantly mechanisms implemented in the process of policy-making), see Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), Department of Homeland Security Privacy Office Annual Reports to the Congress 
available (retrieved from http://www.dhs.gov/xinfoshare/publications/editorial_0514.shtm#1). 
108 According to the PIA guidance, the impact assessments should include such elements as the scope of 
the information collected, uses, information security and information sharing. Furthermore, each section 
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They describe the purpose of the collection, the degree of information sharing, the categories of 
records and individuals covered, record retention and destruction, and how the records are 
retrieved within the system.
109 The introduction of such measures to the EU system, 
implemented simultaneously with a stronger role for national data protection authorities, the 
Article 29 Working Party and the EU Data Protection Supervisor, could improve the legitimacy 
of the process and render some controversial policy measures more acceptable to the public. 
5.2  More transparency and accountability 
The above analysis also raises many questions about the allegiances of major EU actors. As 
correctly noted by some of the observers, the positions of the European Commission and the 
Council seem to give more consideration to US national interests than they do to representing 
those of EU citizens. Therefore, there is a clear need for improvements to the transparency and 
accountability of the process, which may contribute to diminishing suspicion among the public. 
This can be achieved in several ways.  
Parliamentary oversight needs to be improved. The abolition of the pillar structure through the 
Treaty of Lisbon is a good step in this direction since it gives the European Parliament a larger 
role under the co-decision procedure. Nevertheless, even the formal procedures are not always 
effective in creating a cooperative environment. In addition, the over-formalisation of the 
process may sometimes jeopardise policy-making. Therefore, what is really needed is formal 
and informal dialogue among the EU institutions, in particular between the European 
Parliament, the Commission and the Council. At the same time, the Fundamental Rights 
Agency and European Data Protection Supervisor should be given powers in the external 
dimension of data protection cooperation and if necessary, their competencies should be 
expanded to cover third-pillar matters. 
Improvements to transparency and accountability would help the EU to consolidate its positions 
and would contribute to the emergence of a more coherent EU voice. While it would not prevent 
discussion about contentious points, it would at least facilitate the inclusion of more participants 
and views in the public debate. Consequently, we would avoid situations in which some actors 
are ‘surprised’ by decisions already taken, while reducing the possibilities for conflict. 
5.3  Bridging private sector and non-governmental organisations 
Another set of problems relates to the cooperation between the EU institutions and the private 
sector. Whereas the private sector benefits from wide access to policy-makers – a tendency 
likely to grow with the increasing use of new technologies and the greater level of public–
private sector cooperation proposed in the Commission Communication
110 – the limited 
participation of non-governmental organisations in the policy-making process is problematic. 
Therefore, there is a clear need for a platform on which civil liberties organisations and 
government representatives can interact.  
The case of EU–US homeland security proves the importance of dialogue for mutual learning 
and building trust. Unfortunately, often these groups (i.e. private-sector companies and non-
governmental organisations) operate far too distinctly from one another, leading to the situation 
in which each speaks a different language. Such a fragmentation of positions within the EU 
further undermines the EU’s position globally. Therefore, stimulating dialogue among existing 
                                                                                                                                                            
to mitigate those risks. See Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Homeland Security 
Privacy Office Annual Reports to the Congress, July 2007–July 2008, DHS, Washington, D.C., 2008(a). 
109 Ibid. 
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platforms or providing new opportunities would be desirable. For instance, initiatives such as 
the EU Framework Programmes could provide beneficial treatment and take advantage of 
integrated private–private initiatives in which private sector and non-governmental 
organisations (e.g. civil liberties organisations) submit joint project proposals or introduce peer 
review processes. In addition, the involvement of private actors and the academic community 
could provide impetus for further transatlantic integration and the development of the 
“transatlantic common space”
111 suggested by the Informal High-Level Advisory Group on the 
Future of European Home Affairs Policy (the Future Group). One format could be the 
establishment of a joint EU–US homeland security institute that would bring together major 
stakeholders from both sides of the Atlantic: scholars and practitioners in the field of law, 
security and trade from the US and from the EU. The analysis undertaken by particular teams in 
such an institute would provide the background and feed discussions between American and EU 
policy-makers, based on facts and objective analysis rather than political assessment alone. Such 
an institute would also closely cooperate with other stakeholders, including the Fundamental 
Rights Agency, the EU Data Protection Supervisor, the European Ombudsman and the Article 
29 Working Party. This solution would further depoliticise the process and push the debate 
more towards content than emotions. 
5.4  Towards a global approach to data protection 
Given the scope of transatlantic cooperation in the field of homeland security and the extent to 
which the EU’s policies borrow from solutions introduced in the US or in other countries 
(Canada or Australia), it would be advantageous to focus some efforts on working towards 
global solutions. For instance, several countries (as well as the EU) are working on the 
establishment of ‘trusted traveller’ programmes. Without coherence among these programmes 
or mutual recognition, citizens will be exposed to several systems, each based on its own merits. 
In such cases, a common system or mutual recognition agreements could prove valuable. An 
appropriate format for working towards such a system or agreement would be within the 
existing international organisations (i.e. IATA, ICAO, the OECD or Council of Europe). At the 
EU–US level, it could be done within a transatlantic homeland security agency, set up in a 
similar way as several other agencies in the EU. In view of the sensitivity of the issues at hand, 
it would not have any regulatory power but rather contribute to policy-making by providing 
information and studies. It would also contribute greatly to diminishing the workload of 
officials on both sides of the Atlantic. 
 
                                                      
111 The report of the Future Group states that “consideration could further be given to a common 
transatlantic space with more sharing of relevant information and at the same time greater protection of 
personal data, expedited travel for bona fide passengers and more secure borders”. See Future Group, 
Freedom, Security and Privacy – European home affairs in an open world, Report of the Informal High-
Level Advisory Group on the Future of European Home Affairs Policy, Brussels, June 2008 (retrieved 
from www.statewatch.org).  
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